We examine the extent to which firms use past performance as a basis for setting earnings targets in their executive bonus plans and assess the implications of such targets for managerial incentives. We find that well-performing firms commonly reduce earnings targets when executives fail to meet their prior-year target but rarely increase targets. Conversely, we find that poorly performing firms commonly increase earnings targets when executives meet or exceed their prior-year target but rarely decrease targets. This target revision process yields a serial correlation in target difficulty in that targets remain relatively easy (or difficult) through time.
Introduction
An important element of firms' management control systems is the practice of establishing targets for future performance. Such practices serve to organize and coordinate firms' decisions and form the basis for performance evaluation and compensation (Maher, Stickney, and Weil [2007] , Merchant and Van der Stede [2007] ). Although the importance of performance targets in managing organizations is immutable, prior evidence on how firms set performance targets and revise them over time is scant because researchers rarely have access to such internal information (Murphy [2001] ). In this study, we provide novel empirical evidence about firms' target setting practices based on a confidential survey of executive compensation practices of 666 entities. In particular, we examine the extent to which firms use past performance as a basis for setting earnings targets in their executive bonus plans and assess the implications of such targets for managerial incentives.
Our empirical analyses proceed along four lines. First, we describe the cross-sectional distribution of earnings targets (measured as return on sales). A key highlight is our finding of a relatively high frequency of zero (or slightly positive) earnings targets and a low frequency of loss targets. This suggests that the widely-documented discontinuity at zero in distributions of ex post reported earnings (Hayn [1995] , Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] ) extends to ex ante earnings targets as well. In fact, we show that this discontinuity is more pronounced in ex ante earnings targets than in ex post reported earnings.
Second, we examine the extent to which earnings targets reflect information from past performance. This is important because using past performance as a criterion in determining performance targets can adversely affect incentives (Weitzman [1980] ). Prior studies find that firms commonly revise earnings targets upwards when their managers exceed prior-year targets yet do not revise targets downwards (or revise targets less) when managers fail to meet prioryear targets (Leone and Rock [2002] , Zimmerman [2008] , Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole [2010] ). We find a similar result for poorly-performing firms but quite the opposite for wellperforming firms. 1 In particular, we find that well-performing firms commonly reduce earnings targets if their managers fail to meet prior-year targets and rarely increase earnings targets even if their managers exceed prior-year targets. These findings are consistent with contracting theories suggesting that firms can alleviate incentive conflicts if they can commit to longer-term contracts that allow managers of well-performing firms to earn rents that persist through time while managers of poorly performing firms earn little or no rents (Baron and Besanko [1984] ).
Third, we examine the implications of target setting practices for managerial incentives as reflected in managers' perceptions of target difficulty (or the estimated likelihood that targets will be achieved). We note that the incentive consequences of targets based on past performance depend in part on whether the revised targets are harder or easier to achieve than before. For example, it is well established theoretically that managers have weak ex ante incentives to be productive if they anticipate that current performance will be incorporated into future targets in a way that renders future targets more difficult to achieve (Milgrom and Roberts [1992] ). Incentive conflicts of this sort can be overcome and managerial incentives can be strengthened if firms use past performance information judiciously in a way that continually rewards good past performance. Such performance evaluation practices effectively imply commitments to make future targets easier for managers who have performed well in the past and harder for managers who have performed poorly.
Consistent with this commitment perspective, we find evidence that the difficulty of performance targets depends on prior-year performance. In particular, we find that the likelihood of meeting 2009 earnings targets for managers who exceeded their 2008 target is 22% higher than for managers who failed to meet their 2008 target. In addition, the likelihood of meeting 2009 targets for well-performing managers is 11% higher than for poorly-performing managers, even after controlling for prior-year performance relative to target. These findings imply that target revisions are tempered or limited in the sense that they do not use all information available from past performance and as a consequence enhance managers' ex-ante incentives to be productive. targets are far more appropriate, then we expect zero earnings targets to be harder to achieve than other targets. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the likelihood of achieving zero earnings targets in 2009 is 24% lower than the likelihood of achieving other earnings targets.
This finding implies that the frequency of zero earnings targets is abnormally high and is not just an artifact of the distributional properties of earnings or research method choices (Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson [2007] , Durtschi and Easton [2009] ).
Our study contributes to prior literature by presenting novel evidence that zero (or slightly positive) earnings targets are more prevalent in practice than other targets and are more difficult to achieve than other targets. Given that earnings targets are an important dimension of most bonus plans in practice, our finding suggests that incentive contracting can potentially contribute to our understanding of the observed discontinuities in earnings distributions (Matsunaga and Park [2001] , Huddart [2008] ).
Our study is also the first to empirically document that using past performance as a criterion in setting performance targets need not have an adverse effect on incentives. For example, we find no evidence that good performance in one period renders future targets more difficult to achieve. On the contrary, we show that earnings targets for well-performing managers are relatively easy-to-achieve and more likely to be revised downwards than earnings targets for poorly performing managers. More generally, our results collectively suggest that firms incorporate past performance information into targets yet they do so only to a limited extent. We interpret these results as generally consistent with theoretical arguments that highlight the incentive benefits of contractual commitments (Laffont and Tirole [1993] ).
In the next section, we review the prior literature and motivate our analyses. In Section 3 we describe our survey, our data, and empirical measures. In Section 4 we present descriptive evidence on earnings targets and bonus plans during the 2008-2009 period. In Section 5 we test our predictions. In the last section we provide concluding remarks and highlight potential limitations of our study.
Theory and Hypotheses
Executive bonus plans are a key component of management control systems. In practice, these plans are often described in terms of three basic elements: (1) a relation between pay and performance, (2) performance measures, most of which are annual accounting-based metrics, and (3) targets or standards of performance (Murphy [2001] ). A large body of literature in accounting, finance, and economics focuses primarily on the first element of executive bonus plans. For example, studies in this literature often estimate executive pay-for-performance sensitivities and propose them as indicators of the efficacy of incentive compensation plans including bonus plans (e.g., Jensen and Murphy [1990] , Hall and Liebman [1998] ). There is also a large body of accounting literature that examines the second element of executive bonus plans.
For instance, studies in this literature suggest that firms' choices of accounting-based performance measures reflects the informational properties of accounting measures relative to nonfinancial measures or stock-price based measures (e.g., Lambert and Larcker [1987] , Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith [1996] , Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan [1997] ).
In this paper, we focus on the third element of executive bonus plans-performance targets or standards. Prior research on performance targets is limited in part because researchers rarely have access to information about firms' target setting practices. Nevertheless, it is well understood that firms can use performance targets to provide high-powered incentives in a cost effective manner (Milgrom and Roberts [1992] , Raju and Srinivasan [1996] , Murphy [2001] ).
An important incentive design choice in this regard is how to set target difficulty or calibrate the ease with which managers achieve their performance targets (e.g., Merchant and Manzoni [1989] , Kim and Yang [2010] ). Central to the problem of how firms set target difficulty is the question of how firms revise targets in response to prior-year performance. While large sample evidence concerning firms' target revision processes is scant, several studies based on singlefirm data suggest that targets ratchet over time, i.e., targets are increased when actual performance exceeds the prior-year target, but are not decreased or decreased less when actual performance falls short of the target (e.g., Leone and Rock [2002] , Leone, Misra, and Zimmerman [2004] , Bouwens and Kroos [2011] ). Hence, we begin our analysis of performance targets by reexamining this target ratcheting hypothesis for our cross-sectionally diverse sample. It is well known that the target revision process described in H1 may adversely affect managerial incentives. If targets ratchet, managers may intentionally withhold productive effort whenever they anticipate that good current performance renders future targets more difficult to achieve (e.g., Weitzman [1980] Baron and Besanko [1984] ). To empirically proxy for economic rents, we follow Indjejikian and Matějka [2006] and measure the extent to which performance targets are relatively easy to achieve. We have:
H2b: Earnings targets are more difficult to achieve for poorly-performing managers than for well-performing managers.
The preceding discussion suggests that contractual commitments that facilitate communication of private information translate to easy targets for well-performing managers and difficult targets for poorly-performing managers. In turn, this has implications for how firms revise performance targets over time. For well-performing managers, we predict that when prioryear performance exceeds target, the current target is not revised upwards appreciably in order to sustain easy targets and hence managers' ability to earn future rents. On the other hand, when well-performing managers fail to meet their prior-year target, we predict that the current target is revised downwards in order to maintain managers' ability to earn future rents. We predict the opposite for poorly-performing managers. That is, when these managers exceed their prior-year target, the current target is revised upwards to limit managers' ability to earn future rents. On the other hand, when poorly-performing managers fail to meet their prioryear target, we predict that the current target is not revised downwards appreciably in order to preclude managers' ability to earn future rents. (Acharya, John, and Sundaram [2000] ). H3b implies that this reluctance to revise targets downwards is even more pronounced for managers who performed poorly even prior to the recession. Because many of these managers are likely to report negative earnings during a severe recession, we predict that firms are less likely to adopt negative earnings targets than warranted by recessionary expectations. Of course, during economic downturns, such target setting practices also conserve cash and potentially minimize shareholder complaints of unwarranted executive compensation arrangements (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker [2002] ).
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If firms are reluctant to adopt negative earnings targets during economic downturns, then we expect to observe zero (or slightly positive) earnings targets even in situations where firms expect losses and zero targets are unlikely to be achieved. This implies that, in recessionary times, the distribution of earnings targets should be characterized by a relatively high frequency of zero targets and a low frequency of loss targets. Empirically, we infer that the frequency of zero earnings targets is unusually high by comparing the degree of target difficulty across the distribution of earnings targets. In particular, we test the hypothesis that zero earnings targets are more difficult to achieve than other earnings targets.
H4:
Earnings targets set at zero are more difficult to achieve than other earnings targets.
Research Design

SAMPLE AND DATA
Our data come from a survey of AICPA members who work in industry at the corporate or business unit (BU) level with one of the following titles: CEO, CFO, COO, controller, VP finance, president, managing director, or manager. The survey was conducted during May-July 2009 and designed to elicit information about performance targets in executive incentive plans.
Selected AICPA members received an e-mail invitation to participate in an online survey in May 2009 which was followed by two e-mail reminders shortly thereafter. This procedure yielded an initial sample of respondents consisting of CEOs (10%), CFOs (63%) or other financial executives reporting directly to a CFO (23%). 4 From this initial sample, we exclude nonprofit entities, entities with sales less than $10 million, and entities with no or invalid data on sales, actual or targeted earnings. 5 We also exclude seven entities with extreme losses (defined as entities where the absolute value of losses exceeds sales). 6 Our final sample includes 666 entities although the sample available for some of our analyses is smaller due to missing values for some variables.
In addition, for some of our tests we use supplementary data on actual and targeted earnings as well as performance target difficulty drawn from a 2005 survey of 90 entities.
Although this sample of 90 firms is also analyzed in Matějka, Merchant, and Van der Stede [2009] , the data items we use from this survey are unique to our study.
MEASURES
Actual and targeted earnings and sales. We use three survey items to collect information about Difficulty of performance targets. We measure performance target difficulty as respondents' estimates of the likelihood that they meet their earnings targets (for comparison, we also report the likelihood of meeting other financial targets and objective nonfinancial targets). In particular, we measure earnings target difficulty using the following survey question (see question 1 in the Appendix): "Given the current business environment, how likely is it that you will meet your 2009 bonus targets?" We define "bonus target" in the survey to be the performance level necessary to earn the full targeted bonus (as opposed to some minimum performance level below which no bonuses are paid or some maximum performance level at which bonuses may be capped). T09PR is the percentage reported that corresponds to the first response item "Earnings target." The remaining two response items pertain to the likelihood of meeting "Other financial performance targets" (T09PR_FIN) and to the likelihood of meeting "Objective nonfinancial targets" (T09PR_NFIN), respectively. of which are measured using a five-point Likert scale, suggest that most entities in our sample expect some positive growth (the median response is "6-12%") and have adequate capital for their operations. For instance, only about 6% of our sample entities expect negative growth and only about 7% of our sample entities strongly disagree with the statement that they have adequate capital for the near term.
Descriptive Evidence
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The median of NOISE implies that respondents perceive that financial performance measures reflect managerial performance to a high extent. The median of RETAIN, representing the response "Somewhat disagree" with the statement that retention is a key objective of 2009 bonus plans, suggests that executive retention is not the primary concern of most sample entities.
Finally, untabulated statistics indicate that our sample entities represent a variety of industries with the largest concentrations in manufacturing (22% of sample) and finance and insurance (15% of sample).
Panel B of Table 1 describes the compensation plans of our respondents. The median annual base salary for 2008 is $144,000 while the median bonus is $24,000 and median values for all other compensation components are zero. Although the average equity award is valued at $56,502 (slightly larger than the average bonus), it is due to large equity awards in a small fraction of our sample. Only about 17% (6%) of our sample receive equity awards (payouts from long-term cash bonus plans). Thus, most entities in our sample rely on annual cash bonuses as the primary source of incentive compensation for their executives. Panel B of Table 1 also shows that annual bonuses in our sample are largely based on performance relative to financial targets.
Specifically, our sample respondents expect on average 61% of their 2009 annual bonus to be based on performance relative to financial targets (B09FIN), 11% to be based on performance relative to nonfinancial targets (B09NFIN), and 28% to be based on subjective evaluations (B09SUBJ). Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS TARGETS
This section presents the frequency distribution of actual and targeted earnings. First, Panel A of Figure 1 shows the distribution of 2008 actual earnings and replicates a well-established finding that ex post reported earnings exhibit a "discontinuity at zero" (e.g., Hayn [1995], Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] ). In particular, only 17 of the 666 sample entities reported earnings in the interval marked "-2%" (earnings equal or greater than -2% of sales and smaller than -1%) and 18 entities in the interval just below zero (equal or greater than -1% and smaller than 0%). use a z-test for differences in proportions and find that the proportion of targets set at zero (4.5% of 666) is significantly greater (p<0.01) than the proportion of zero actual earnings (1.8%).
Moreover, comparing the frequency of just below zero (defined as the -2% and -1% intervals)
targeted and actual earnings, we find that the proportion of targets just below zero (2.3%) is significantly lower (p<0.01) than the proportion of actual earnings below zero (5.3%).
Third, Panel C of Figure 1 corroborates that earnings targets exhibit a discontinuity at zero using data on 2009 targets. Panel C shows that only 10 of the 666 sample entities had their earnings targets in the "-2%" interval and 9 entities had their earnings targets in the interval just below zero. In contrast, 93 entities had earnings targets in the interval just above zero and 38 of these entities set the target exactly at zero.
Fourth, Panel A and B of Figure 2 compare distributions of 2004 actual and targeted earnings using our supplementary dataset. We find no discontinuity at zero in actual earnings yet a strong discontinuity in earnings targets. For instance, the proportion of targets set at zero (8.0%
of 87) is significantly greater (p<0.01) than zero (none of the 87 entities reported zero actual earnings). Also, the proportion of negative targets (12.6%) is significantly lower (p<0.01) than the proportion of reported losses (35.6%). This is consistent with our earlier finding that the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings targets is more pronounced than in the distribution of actual earnings. (Weitzman [1980: 303] ).
EARNINGS TARGETS AND TARGET DIFFICULTY
To assess implications of earnings target revisions for managerial incentives, it is also important to understand how revisions affect target difficulty. Our measure of target difficulty is based on respondents' estimates of the likelihood of meeting their 2009 earnings targets (T09PR). In this section, we first provide descriptive evidence on the relation between target difficulty and different earnings target levels (Table 3 ) and subsequently examine the relation between target difficulty, target revisions, and past performance (Table 4) .
Panels A and B of 2005 earnings targets, which is significantly lower than 64% for the profit group (p<0.01) and also marginally lower than 57% for the loss group (p=0.11). Table 4 provides preliminary evidence on how earnings target revisions and the resulting target difficulty depend on past performance. We divide our sample into well-performing entities with above-median 2008 return on sales and poorly-performing entities with below median returns. We further subdivide each of the groups based on whether they met or failed to meet their 2008 target. For each of the four groups, we present median (i) performance relative to
earnings target (Y08-T08), (ii) earnings target revision (T09-T08), and (iii) likelihood of meeting 2009 earnings target (T09PR)
; we report medians rather than averages to minimize the influence of outliers.
We find that well-performing entities commonly exceed their prior-year target by a wide margin-conditional on meeting a target, median earnings above the target are 1.33% of sales in well performing as compared to 0.26% in poorly performing firms. However, earnings targets in well-performing entities are not revised upwards most of the time-conditional on meeting the prior-year target, the median revision is 0% in well performing and 0.05% in poorly-performing entities, despite the fact that well-performing entities exceed their target by a much wider margin than poorly-performing entities. We find similar differences in entities that fail to meet their targets. Conditional on failure to meet the prior-year's target, median earnings shortfall is 2.78% of sales in well-performing and 2.72% in poorly-performing entities. In response, well-performing entities revise targets downwards considerably (2.08%) while poorly-performing entities only to a limited extent (0.42%).
The last two columns of Table 4 provide additional evidence that earnings target revisions in poorly-performing entities render the resulting targets more difficult to achieve than in well-performing entities. In particular, while the overall sample median likelihood of achieving 2009 earnings targets is 50%, the median in poorly-performing entities that met their prior-year target is 62.5% and in those that failed to meet the target it is 40%. In contrast, the median in well-performing entities that met their prior-year target is 70% and in those that failed to meet the target it is 50%.
In conclusion, Table 4 provides preliminary evidence consistent with H2-H3 predicting that good past performance is associated with easy targets in the future. In addition, the evidence in Table 3 is consistent with H4 predicting that zero earnings targets are more difficult to achieve than other earnings targets. This corroborates earlier findings in Figures 1 and 2 , that the distribution of earnings targets exhibits a discontinuity at zero and that the frequency of zero targets is abnormally high. 9 The next section builds on this preliminary evidence and presents formal tests of our hypotheses.
Main Analysis
EARNINGS TARGET REVISIONS
In this section, we examine how firms revise earnings targets based on information about prioryear performance relative to target. We follow prior literature (Leone and Rock [2002] , Bouwens and Kroos [2011] ) and model earnings target revisions (T09-T08) as follows:
i.e., we allow the association between earnings target revisions and performance relative to target (Y08-T08) to vary depending on whether prior-year target was met or not (T08FAIL).
The unique feature of our sample is that it consists of highly diverse entities as opposed to single-firm data used in prior studies. This heterogeneity also implies a common occurrence of highly influential outliers in our sample which can render standard OLS estimations unreliable.
Therefore, to estimate model (1), we rely on the least absolute deviations estimator, also referred to as the median regression, which is less sensitive to the problem of outliers (Greene [2008] ).
10 Table 5 presents our estimation results. Column (1) provides little or no evidence of target ratcheting in the sample pooling all observations. H1a predicts that 2 0,
β > yet we find that target revisions upwards are only weakly related (p=0.15) to performance in excess of prior-year targets. Similarly, H1b predicts that 3 0 β < and the estimate in column (1) is negative but insignificant suggesting little or no difference in the sensitivity of target revisions to past performance regardless of whether prior-year performance exceeds or falls short of its target.
We test H3a and H3b by separately estimating model (1) for well-performing entities with above-median 2008 return on sales and poorly-performing entities with below median returns. 11 The results in Column (2) of Table 5 In summary, we find that well-performing entities are willing to revise earnings targets downwards but are reluctant to revise targets upwards in response to prior-year performance relative to target. The opposite result holds for poorly-performing entities. In other words, when setting targets for next year, poorly-performing entities discount bad news in current performance while well-performing entities discount good news. These results underscore the importance of controlling for performance when estimating models of target revisions. More generally, these results support the theory highlighting the benefits of target setting practices that incorporate information about past performance only to a limited extent.
TOBIT MODELS OF EARNINGS TARGET DIFFICULTY
As discussed before, the incentive consequences of target revisions largely depend on the extent to which such revisions render the resulting targets easy or hard to achieve. To better understand the drivers of earnings target difficulty, this section models the likelihood of meeting 2009 earnings targets (T09PR) and presents tests of H2 and H4.
H2a predicts that failure to meet prior-year targets renders them more difficult to achieve next year. H2b predicts a higher target difficulty in poorly-performing than in well-performing entities (regardless whether they met the prior-year target or not). We note that the indicator variable for poorly-performing entities is correlated with the indicator variable for failure to meet prior-year targets as well as with most of the control variables and industry fixed effects.
Therefore, we first estimate models of target difficulty with limited number of control variables as well as models which include only one of the two indicator variables.
In particular, our baseline model includes T08FAIL, Y08ROS_LO, and indicator variables for the different types of entities in our sample (public vs. private, corporate vs. BU level) which are unlikely to change over time and thus are uncorrelated with past performance. We take into account that our dependent variable has a probability mass both at 0% and 100% and estimate the following Tobit model: 
H2a implies 5 0 β < and H2b implies 6 0. β < Consistent with both hypotheses, column (1) of Table 6 shows that the likelihood of meeting 2009 targets in entities that failed to meet their 2008 targets is 22% lower (p<0.01) than in entities that met or exceeded their targets.
In addition, the likelihood of meeting 2009 targets in poorly-performing entities is 11% lower (p=0.03) than in well-performing entities, even after controlling for past performance relative to target. These estimates are similar to those in the last two columns of Table 4 as well as those in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 , which include the remaining control variables and industry fixed effects.
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Column (2) of Table 6 also shows that most of our control variables are significantly associated with T09PR. In particular, the likelihood of meeting 2009 targets is about 15% higher (p=0.04) in private than in public companies. Earnings targets are also relatively easy (more likely to be achieved) in entities with high growth (p<0.01), sufficient amount of capital for the short term (p<0.01), entities that are large (p<0.01) and those concerned about executive retention (p=0.03).
To test H4, we control for all the above effects and additionally include an indicator variable for 2009 earnings targets equal to zero (T09ZERO). Note that T09ZERO is neither exogenous nor predetermined and we estimate our model as an auxiliary regression testing the strength of the association between T09PR and T09ZERO controlling for other effects.
Consistent with H4, column (4) of Table 6 shows that the likelihood of achieving 2009 targets in entities with zero 2009 earnings targets is 24% lower (p=0.01) than in entities with other targets.
This suggests that, instead of setting achievable but negative earnings targets, many firms prefer to stretch their target to zero even if the resulting target becomes very difficult to achieve. Thus, earnings targets may get revised downwards but rarely below zero which is consistent with our theory that firms commit not to fully update targets in response to poor past performance.
Summary and Conclusion
How firms set and revise earnings targets in their incentive plans has long been an important topic in accounting research. Theoretically, it is well recognized that performance targets can have important incentive effects, particularly through time as managers anticipate that their current performance may be used as a basis for setting future targets. However, empirical evidence in this area is limited due to the difficulty of obtaining confidential data on how firms set internal targets and consequently little is known about the incentive implications of firms' target setting practices. In this paper, we use data about the target setting practices of 666 entities obtained via a confidential survey conducted during the 2008-2009 economic recession.
Overall, our findings suggest that firms use past performance information in setting targets yet they do so only in a limited manner. In particular, we find that the target revision process in well-performing firms differs from the process in poorly-performing firms. For instance, we find that well-performing firms commonly reduce earnings targets if their managers fail to meet their prior-year targets but rarely increase earnings targets even if their managers exceed prior-year targets. In contrast, poorly-performing firms commonly revise targets upwards if their managers exceed their prior-year targets but rarely decrease earnings targets otherwise.
These findings are consistent with contracting theories suggesting that firms can alleviate incentive conflicts if they can commit to longer-term contracts that reward managers of wellperforming firms with easier targets and economic rents that persist through time.
We also find that the cross-sectional distribution of ex-ante earnings targets in our sample is characterized by a high frequency of zero (or slightly positive) earnings targets and a low frequency of loss targets despite the recessionary time period in which our survey was conducted. This suggests a target revision process that deliberately avoids negative earnings targets in favor of zero (or just above zero) targets even if such practices translate to harder to achieve targets. We note that this finding mirrors the widely-documented discontinuity at zero in the cross-sectional distribution of ex-post reported earnings but defer an analysis of how ex-ante target earnings distributions translate to ex-post actual earnings distributions to future research.
Finally, we note that our study is subject to a few important limitations. First, by the very nature of survey data, we rely on our respondents to recall information from the past and to accurately communicate sensitive compensation and performance related information. This concern is alleviated somewhat by our guarantee of confidentiality and our commitment to refrain from collecting information about individual or firm identity. Second, because of space constraints on the survey questionnaire and the anonymity of the respondents, we have little additional information about the broader compensation practices and other characteristics of our sample entities. These limitations notwithstanding, we believe our study provides important new evidence on how firms set and revise earnings targets. (1) (2) (3) 
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